UKGI's written submission to the PO Inquiry admit, whilst downplaying, serious corporate governance failings whilst pointing the finger at PO executives and their GCs
On 1 December 2020 the JFSA submitted a complaint of maladministration against BEIS and HMG to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. It was suggested that JFSA would have a response by Spring 2022, which would likely be highly relevant to UKGI's activities. Is there some 'deadly embrace' delaying publication of the findings?
".... the main failings of the Scandal were largely the fault of PO execs, with interim GC Aujard, CEO Vennells and, uh, PowerPoint presentations featuring heavily. (I would add den Bogerd) ....... Their claim essentially is that the Board was kept in the dark."
As an ex IT employee of RM/POL (as they were then) I am aware that the Board received regular (possibly monthly) Risk Assessment Reports from the Horizon Programme Manager within CSC, from the Information Security team and, presumably, from Fujitsu. It would be surprising if they did not list the issues and important faults. A FoI should be carried out to uncover the Board's awareness.
On 1 December 2020 the JFSA submitted a complaint of maladministration against BEIS and HMG to the Parliamentary and Health Service Ombudsman. It was suggested that JFSA would have a response by Spring 2022, which would likely be highly relevant to UKGI's activities. Is there some 'deadly embrace' delaying publication of the findings?
I have been wondering about this. Do we know for sure there has not been a substantive response to the complaint?
There's nothing showing at https://www.jfsa.org.uk/the-complaint--beis-response--jfsa-reply.html and it would be odd for the response to a crowdfunded complaint not to made available (at the very least to those of us who helped to fund it).
".... the main failings of the Scandal were largely the fault of PO execs, with interim GC Aujard, CEO Vennells and, uh, PowerPoint presentations featuring heavily. (I would add den Bogerd) ....... Their claim essentially is that the Board was kept in the dark."
As an ex IT employee of RM/POL (as they were then) I am aware that the Board received regular (possibly monthly) Risk Assessment Reports from the Horizon Programme Manager within CSC, from the Information Security team and, presumably, from Fujitsu. It would be surprising if they did not list the issues and important faults. A FoI should be carried out to uncover the Board's awareness.