One point leaps out to me in this (and other) discussions you have led: If Parsons (and also some of the other senior lawyers whose actions are coming under the microscope) are simply conduits without any responsibility for the advice they are passing along, why on earth are they being paid thousand(s) of pounds a day? Surely a motorcycle messenger or a teleprinter could do the same job at a fraction of the price! Presumably Mr Parsons believes he is worth his fees: what value does he think he added to the various topics he 'reviewed'. That is the question I would like to hear anawered.
I see it slightly differently, although I completely agree about the outcomes. I think Horizon was an example of the "waterfall" methodology popular at the time and that this, plus the associated contractual relationship, fixed the project very firmly in shape throughout the life of the scandal, putting a wall between what Fujitsu understood and the PO's view of Horizon. It allowed the PO to delegate all thinking about Horizon as a technical system to the supplier whilst managing it themselves as a reputational asset. It also allowed the fatal IT service management split across two service desks to operate from the outset, creating a void into which the users' voices disappeared.
You write in your opening: "One of the many interesting conversations I have had with practitioners about the Post Office Scandal was a suggestion that large projects take on a life of their own beyond the control of those working on them. They are big, sprawl over time, involve many hands, different kinds of expertise, and so on."
That's true, and it appears to have contributed significantly to the Post Office debacle.
But as I have followed developments from the United States -- different legal system, different governmental structure, different social services model -- I have repeatedly been struck by the shocking mediocrity of so many of the high-ranking/influential players.
To my admittedly inexpert and vaguely-informed (at best) eyes, many of these appear to have risen through the ranks of, and been selected from, an insular, self-perpetuating, upper/aristocratic class with the overarching credo of "don't rock the boat." Not true across the board, I'm sure, but I think in many instances a strong argument can be made for that conclusion.
So yes, big projects can take on a life of their own, becoming as difficult to steer as a mega-oil tanker in a shopping center parking lot. But that does not absolve the leadership from their many horrific failures, nor does it absolve a legal system that, from this foreigner's perspective, lacks many of the checks and balances that we in the United States rely on to increase the odds that justice prevails.
One point leaps out to me in this (and other) discussions you have led: If Parsons (and also some of the other senior lawyers whose actions are coming under the microscope) are simply conduits without any responsibility for the advice they are passing along, why on earth are they being paid thousand(s) of pounds a day? Surely a motorcycle messenger or a teleprinter could do the same job at a fraction of the price! Presumably Mr Parsons believes he is worth his fees: what value does he think he added to the various topics he 'reviewed'. That is the question I would like to hear anawered.
I see it slightly differently, although I completely agree about the outcomes. I think Horizon was an example of the "waterfall" methodology popular at the time and that this, plus the associated contractual relationship, fixed the project very firmly in shape throughout the life of the scandal, putting a wall between what Fujitsu understood and the PO's view of Horizon. It allowed the PO to delegate all thinking about Horizon as a technical system to the supplier whilst managing it themselves as a reputational asset. It also allowed the fatal IT service management split across two service desks to operate from the outset, creating a void into which the users' voices disappeared.
You write in your opening: "One of the many interesting conversations I have had with practitioners about the Post Office Scandal was a suggestion that large projects take on a life of their own beyond the control of those working on them. They are big, sprawl over time, involve many hands, different kinds of expertise, and so on."
That's true, and it appears to have contributed significantly to the Post Office debacle.
But as I have followed developments from the United States -- different legal system, different governmental structure, different social services model -- I have repeatedly been struck by the shocking mediocrity of so many of the high-ranking/influential players.
To my admittedly inexpert and vaguely-informed (at best) eyes, many of these appear to have risen through the ranks of, and been selected from, an insular, self-perpetuating, upper/aristocratic class with the overarching credo of "don't rock the boat." Not true across the board, I'm sure, but I think in many instances a strong argument can be made for that conclusion.
So yes, big projects can take on a life of their own, becoming as difficult to steer as a mega-oil tanker in a shopping center parking lot. But that does not absolve the leadership from their many horrific failures, nor does it absolve a legal system that, from this foreigner's perspective, lacks many of the checks and balances that we in the United States rely on to increase the odds that justice prevails.
Grenfell is a perfect example of the scenario you describe Richard